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BOOK REVIEWS
LAWYERS, LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE. By Esther Lucile
Brown. Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1948. Pp. 258. $3.00.
In this extraordinarily valuable report the Director of Studies in the
Professions at the Russell Sage Foundation gives a clear picture of the rela-
tion between what lawyers do in the United States government and how
law schools prepare them to do it. Official agencies provide one of the
major careers open to talent, and especially to the talent molded or warped
by the standard law schools. Miss Brown begins by reviewing the facts
about lawyers in government and ends by evaluating the facts and fancies
of legal instruction.
After a census of the numbers involved, the author makes' a path-
breaking report on the part played by lawyers in the policy process of all
federal agencies where they are found. The record shows the many points
at which the lawyer takes a hand in the making of decisions.
I suppose the most remarkable thing about the part of the book devoted
to the theories and practices of legal education is the degree of unanimity
among the schools. There are, to be sure, differences in the wording used
by deans and professors. And yet, whether you look East, West, North
or South, the same ferment is stirring. One by-product of the book is the
breaking down of whatever stereotype has hitherto prevailed about the
"great Eastern law schools" as monopolists of prophetic inspiration, ingen-
ious experiment, or hard work in modernizing legal instruction.
In what does the agreement consist? The first item (and I draw this
from the material assembled by Miss Brown) has to do with the distinctive
skill of the lawyer, the mastery of appellate court opinions. The consensus
is that this is not enough to equip the fledgling lawyer to seize the oppor-
tunities or to measure up to the needs of our world. The second item is
that factual knowledge of the social process is essential. Or, to phrase this
in a more sophisticated way, the traditional skills need supplementation by
skill in data gathering and analysis. The third point is less easy to express
because it comes out at the pores of much current self-criticism. There is
some sense that something needs to be done to keep the lawyer feeling and
behaving as a professional man conscious of community values, and equipped
to aid all individuals and organizations in the task of correlating policies
with values.
Diversities of view crop out when you look at the means by which the
schools propose to accomplish the new goals. All sorts of bold new projects
have been born, some of which have lived beyond the first year. But the
mortality of initiative has been formidably great, and the gap between aim
and performance is enormous. After recounting what she saw, heard and
suspects, Miss Brown put her general prescription in these words:
"For any considerable expansion of the intellectual horizon of
legal education, at least three things are prerequisite: larger financial
resources, teaching staffs, and research and clinical facilities; an over-
all Plan for each school; and a more affirmative attitude toward the
task of law and government." (p. 246).
It is to be hoped that the Russell Sage Foundation will make provision
for Miss Brown to re-survey the field of law and the public service from
time to time in the next few years. Scholars and practitioners need the
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mirror of fact held up to their faces, and Miss Brown is a candid, discrim-
inating and sympathetic reporter. It is to be hoped, however, that in
future surveys "public service" will be more clearly distinguished from
"government service." Miss Brown is entirely justified in playing up the
much neglected place of government in the careers open to law graduates.
She knows, of course, that serving the aims of our society is not the same
as being a government official, and that the task of the new legal educa-
tion is not to substitute the training of Washington smarties for Wall Street
slickies. The point can be more obvious when proportionate space is given
to the policy impacts of the private practitioner in relation to his clients
and to the organized activities of the bar and other associations. Miss
Brown is fully cognizant of the point that the policies of a democratic so-
ciety are made wherever significant choices are made, whether the chooser
is conventionally called a legislator, a public official, a business owner, a
business manager, a union official, or something else. Every choice needs
the discipline of voluntary submission to the goal values of a society that
aspires toward freedom. Many choices must be subject to compulsory re-
view. The role of the lawyer, insofar as he lives up to the standards of a
profession, is to aid in harmonizing all choices, voluntary and involuntary,
with democratic values.
Harold D. Lasswell.t
A DEcLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH. By Wiley Rutledge. University
of Kansas Press, 1947. Pp. 82. $2.00.
A declaration of faith-legal or otherwise-ought to be exempt from
a too probing logical analysis. Certainly Justice Rutledge's legal faith as
here declared is not characterized by narrow adherence to a particular
school. While at one point he says that ideas of justice "change with time
and circumstance," he asserts elsewhere his belief in "abstract justice" "as
the source from which conceptions of concrete and legally relevant justice
arise." Plato and Darwin are thus brought into friendly association, and
presently Bergson is added to the company by acceptance of the concep-
tion of law as "a purposeful striving in evolutionary processes."
Underlying all this is usually a substratum of optimism. There are
times, however, when Justice Rutledge appears to take a rather dim view
of the future. Having declared: ". . . law, freedom, and justice-this
trinity is the object of my faith," he straightway adds a fourth tenet:
• .. the law is universal, if not in the sense that chaos cannot override
it, then in the necessity for it now or soon to have universal application,
unless justice under law is to perish from the earth"; and earlier he had
voiced the opinion that "science and invention had made it no longer pos-
sible for a nation and its people attached to either view"-i. e., totalitarian-
ism or the tradition of individual freedom-"to hold assurance of continued
life in contiguity with nations and peoples devoted to the contrary prin-
ciple." But in the end cheerfulness breaks through again, and the Justice,
taking courage from the achievment of the founders of our system in
abolishing the Confederation and launching a nation in its stead, propounds
a fifth article of faith, though somewhat faintly. The federal principle, he
suggests, may make it possible to achieve "the same end" "on a broader
scale, inclusive of the World."
'I Professor of Law, Yale University School of Law.
